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Abstract
We compare emission cap commitment that restricts total emissions and emis-
sion intensity commitment that restricts emissions per unit of output as measures
of self-regulation. The monopolist chooses either emission cap commitment or emis-
sion intensity commitment and sets the target level under the constraint that the
resulting emissions do not exceed the upper limit. We nd that prot-maximizing
rms choose emission cap commitment, although emission intensity commitment al-
ways yields greater consumer surplus. It is ambiguous whether emission intensity
commitment or emission cap commitment yields greater welfare. We present two
cases in which emission intensity commitment yields greater welfare. One is the most
stringent target case (the target emission level is close to zero), and the other is the
weakest target case (the target emission level is close to business-as-usual). Our re-
sult suggests that the incentive for adopting emission cap commitment is too large
for prot-maximizing rms, and thus, governments should encourage the adoption of
emission intensity commitment, especially to achieve a zero-emission society eciently.
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1 Introduction
Self-regulatory actions by an industry or rms have received considerable attention from
economists and policymakers. In particular, self-regulation has been introduced in environ-
mental policies as a tool to improve the environment, in addition to command-and-control
regulation and/or economic incentives, such as emission taxes and tradable permits. Firms
publicly initiate pledges to improve their environmental performance and undertake eorts
to attain the goals by themselves.1 A typical question regarding self-regulation is why rms
voluntarily take certain actions even though they are costly. The literature on self-regulation
suggests that polluting rms strategically act and self-regulate because of the threat of fu-
ture regulation by regulatory authorities (e.g., Maxwell et al., 2000; Antweiler, 2003; Lyon
and Maxwell, 2003; Fleckinger and Glachant 2011). Maxwell et al. (2000) formulated a
theoretical model in which rms can choose their levels of voluntary pollution prior to po-
litical action by consumers leading to mandatory regulation and showed that self-regulation
eectively preempts political entry. Antweiler (2003) empirically tested the eect of green
regulatory threat. In addition, private politics, such as a boycott, have been used to explain
the motivation of voluntary actions. Egorov and Harstad (2017) examined the interaction
among public regulation, self-regulation, and boycott as private politics and showed the
possibility of self-regulation. There is, however, another natural question to self-regulation:
what measure should rms adopt as self-regulation?
There are several ways to commit to improve environmental performance.2 Consider
air pollution or carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. A commitment to decrease the total
1This form of self-regulation is called \unilateral commitments" in which the target is set by the industry
or companies themselves. The OECD (1999) categorized voluntary environmental agreements into the three
categories of unilateral commitments, public voluntary programs, and negotiated agreements.
2For example, major Japanese rms belonging to the Japan Business Federation, Japan Iron and Steel
Federation, and Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan have committed to either upper bound
of emissions or emission intensity per unit of output. Moreover, an international survey by KPMG in 2015
showed that nearly 92% of Global Fortune 250 rms issued corporate social responsibility reports in 2015,
up from 35% in 1999, and most are concerned with environmental problems.
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emissions or to limit the upper bound of emissions per year is a direct measure (emission
cap commitment). On the other hand, the emission intensity per unit of output is another
popular measure (emission intensity commitment).3 The choice of commitment device might
aect the behavior of rms and resulting welfare.4
We formulate a self-regulation model in which the polluting rm self-regulates to pre-
empt mandatory regulation or to avoid consumer activism, and then the rm determines its
output and abatement. The model employs a general formulation of a monopoly setting to
highlight the dierence between emission intensity commitment and emission cap commit-
ment as measures of self-regulation. Our central concerns are which of emission intensity
commitment or emission cap commitment is chosen by the pollutant, and the ranking of
consumer surplus and social welfare between these two measures of self-regulation. We
compare the equilibrium outcomes at the environmental target, which is a common require-
ment regardless of the measure of self-regulation. Specically, the environmental target is
assumed the total amount of emissions.
We nd that the equilibrium abatement investment and output are larger (and thus,
consumer surplus is larger) under emission intensity commitment than under emission cap
commitment. By contrast, emission cap commitment yields higher prot than does emission
intensity commitment. Therefore, prot-maximizing rms choose emission cap commitment
as a self-regulation tool. From a welfare perspective, however, it is ambiguous whether emis-
sion cap commitment or emission intensity commitment is better. We nd that emission
intensity commitment is unambiguously better than emission cap commitment in two im-
3Japanese electric power companies have committed to CO2 emissions/kWh, not total emissions, as self-
regulation. Japanese Ministry of the Environment has declared that it would introduce stricter regulation
if this self-regulation were to turn out not to work eectively.
4A substantial body of literature on mandatory green regulations compares the dierent forms of manda-
tory regulation, including emission tax, emission cap regulation, and emission intensity regulation. Many
studies have shown that dierent policy instruments yield dierent welfare and environmental consequences,
because dierent policy instruments provide dierent incentives for rms (Besanko, 1987; Helfand, 1991;
Lahiri and Ono, 2007; Kiyono and Ishikawa, 2013; Amir et al., 2017). The studies have mainly focused
on the eects of regulations on welfare and emission levels, and have not discussed rms' incentives for
adopting a regulation measure.
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portant cases: in the case with the strictest target (when the emission target is close to
zero emissions) and in the case with the loosest target (when the emission target is close
to the business-as-usual level). Firms prefer emission cap commitment even when emission
intensity commitment is desirable for welfare. Thus, our result suggests that the incentive to
adopt emission cap commitment is too strong for prot-maximizing rms as a self-regulation
measure and governments should encourage the adoption of emission intensity commitment
rather than emission cap commitment, especially to achieve a zero-emission society e-
ciently.
However, emission cap commitment can yield greater welfare. We show that emission
cap commitment can yield greater welfare, depending on the emission target level and the
curvature of the abatement cost function. If the target level is far from both zero emission
and business-as-usual levels, and the convexity of the abatement cost function is strong,
emission cap commitment is better for welfare.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
analyzes and compares the two self-regulation measures of emission intensity commitment
and emission cap commitment. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider the self-regulation model of a polluting monopoly.5 The rm produces a single
commodity for which the inverse demand function is given by P (q) : R+ 7! R+. We assume
that P (q) is twice continuously dierentiable and P 0(q) < 0 for all q as long as P > 0. Let
C(q) : R+ 7! R+ be the cost function of the rm, where q 2 R+ is the output of the rm.
We suppose C is twice continuously dierentiable, increasing, and convex for all q.6 We
assume that the marginal revenue is decreasing (i.e., 2P 0(q) + P 00(q)q < 0). This condition
5Our results hold in symmetric Cournot oligopolies under the standard conditions (e.g., stability condi-
tions).
6We can relax this assumption. Our results hold if C 00   P 0 > 0 for all q as long as P > 0:
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guarantees that the second-order condition is satised.
Some emissions are associated with production, which yields a negative externality. After
emissions have been generated, they can be reduced by the polluting rm through investment
in abatement technologies.7 Thus, the rm's net emissions are E := g(q) x, where g : R+ 7!
R+ represents emissions associated with production and x(2 R+) is the rm's abatement
level. We assume that g is twice continuously dierentiable, increasing, and convex for all
q.
The rm's prot is
P (q)q   C(q) K(x);
where the third term represents the abatement cost. We suppose that K is twice contin-
uously dierentiable, increasing, and strictly convex for x > 0. We further assume that
K(0) = K 0(0) = 0.8 This assumption guarantees that the social optimal level of abatement
is never zero and that the prot function is smooth.
Total social surplus (rm prots plus consumer surplus minus the loss caused by the
externality) is given by
W =  + CS   (E) =
Z q
0
P (z)dz   C(q) K(x)  (E);
where  : R+ 7! R+ is the welfare loss of emissions.
The rm undertakes self-regulation through emission intensity commitment or emission
cap commitment. One might consider that the regulator should impose an emission tax
or mandatory regulation on the polluting rm in order to restrict emissions rather than
relying on self-regulation. The situation this study considers is similar to that of Segerson
and Miceli (1998), Lyon and Maxwell (2003), Glachant (2007), and Brau and Carraro (2011).
7These are called end-of-pipe technologies. An alternative approach to reduce emissions is to change the
production process. For a recent discussion of the relationship between mandatory regulation and this type
of innovation, see Matsumura and Yamagishi (2017).
8The form of the abatement (R&D) cost function is a standard assumption in industrial organization
and environmental economics (D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1998; Amir et al., 2017).
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Self-regulation might be preferable to mandatory regulation, since the former reduces the
administrative cost associated with serious mandatory regulation by law or avoids political
resistance from regulated industry. Alternatively, if the government plans to impose an
emission tax to reduce total emissions to E and rms expect the possible introduction of an
emission tax following self-regulation, the rms would introduce self-regulation that yields
E = E to prevent the introduction of such an emission tax.
An alternative interpretation of the environmental target that the polluting rm volun-
tary commits to is based on consumer activism. Unlike lobbying or political campaigns,
consumers who have disutility from negative externalities organize activist groups and start
a boycott if their requirements are not met (Egorov and Harstad, 2017). In this case, it is
natural to consider that their concern is emission levels.
We assume that the environmental target is exogenously given. In other words, we
do not model the regulator and the activist group as players. As discussed earlier in this
section, we can describe E depending on the administrative cost, political pressure, or the
opportunity cost of the consumer boycott. There are, however, several ways to formulate
such regimes so that we simply treat the target as an exogenous variable and examine how
the rm undertakes self-regulation at each level, E. We assume that E 2 (0; EB) where EB
is the prot-maximizing emission level without a binding emission target (business-as-usual
level). Let qB be the prot-maximizing output without a binding emission target.
The timing of the game is as follows. Given the environmental target, E, the rm
decides whether to use emission intensity commitment or emission cap commitment in the
rst stage. In the second stage, the rm chooses its output and abatement level to maximize
the prot under the self-regulation it committed to in the rst stage.
3 Analysis
We compare the eects on equilibrium outcomes of the two instruments used in this research.
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3.1 Emission Intensity Commitment
First, we consider the case in which the rm adopts emission intensity commitment as self-
regulation. Let  be the committed upper bound of the emission per unit of output. In the
second stage, the rm chooses its output, q, and abatement level, x, to maximize its prot
subject to
  E
q
=
g(q)  x
q
: (1)
When the constraint is binding9, the rm's optimization problem is
max
q
P (q)q   C(q) K(g(q)  q): (2)
Let the superscript EI denote the equilibrium outcomes under emission intensity commit-
ment. Dene EI(q;) := P (q)q   C(q)  K(g(q)   q). The equilibrium output, qEI(),
is characterized by the following rst-order condition:
@EI
@q
= P 0q + P   C 0  K 0(g0   ) = 0: (3)
The second-order condition is satised. We obtain xEI() = g(qEI())   qEI() and
EEI() = g(qEI())  xEI() = qEI().
Dierentiating (3) leads to
dqEI
d
=  @
2=@q@
@2=@q2
> 0; (4)
where we use @2=@q@ = K 0 + (g0   )K 00q > 0 and @2=@q2 = 2P 0 + P 00q   C 00   g00K 0  
(g0 )2K 00 < 0. An increase in  relaxes the emission restriction and reduces the marginal
cost of production, which increases q.
In the rst stage, the rm sets the emission intensity  =  such that EEI() = E.
Let (qEI( E); xEI( E)) be the pair of equilibrium output and abatement and WEI( E) be the
equilibrium welfare under emission intensity commitment when  = :
9In this game, the constraint is always binding because E < EB .
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3.2 Emission Cap Commitment
Next, we consider the case in which the rm adopts emission cap commitment. The prot
function of the rm is P (q)q   C(q)   K(g(q)   E). Let the superscript EC denote the
equilibrium outcomes under emission cap commitment. Then, the prot function of the rm
under emission cap commitment is dened by EC(q; E) := P (q)q   C(q)   K(g(q)   E).
The equilibrium output, qEC( E), is characterized by the following rst-order condition:
@EC
@q
= P 0q + P   C 0  K 0g0 = 0: (5)
The second-order condition is satised. We obtain xEC( E) = g(qEC( E))  E. Dierentiating
(5) leads to
dqEC
d E
=  @
2=@q@ E
@2=@q2
> 0; (6)
where we use @2=@q@ = K 00g0 > 0 and @2=@q2 = 2P 0 + P 00q   C 00   g00K 0   g02K 00 < 0.
Similar to the emission intensity case, an increase in E increases q.
3.3 Comparison
In this subsection, we compare the two instruments. First, we consider the equilibrium
output. Comparing emission intensity commitment with emission cap commitment, we
present the following result.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium output is larger under emission intensity commitment than under
emission cap commitment, that is, qEI( E) > qEC( E).
Proof.
By using (3), (5), and the emission equivalence, we obtain
@EC
@q

q=qEI
= K 0(g(qEI)  qEI) (g0(qEI)   K 0(g(qEI)  E)g0(qEI)
=  K 0(g(qEI)  qEI) < 0:
This implies that the output level of qEI exceeds the prot-maximizing level under emission
cap commitment, because the second-order condition is satised. 
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Lemma 1 states that the rm produces more outputs under emission intensity commit-
ment than under emission cap commitment even though the resulting emissions from the
pollutant are the same in both regimes. We explain the intuition behind Lemma 1 after
presenting Proposition 1.
From Lemma 1 and the emission equivalence, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Emission intensity commitment yields greater net consumer surplus than emis-
sion cap commitment, that is, CS(qEI( E)  ( E) > CS(qEC( E))  ( E).
Proof.
It is straightforward from the emission equivalence and Lemma 1. 
We now present our result on the rm's prot.
Proposition 1 Emission cap commitment yields higher prot than does emission intensity
commitment (i.e., EC(qEC( E); E) > EI(qEI( E); ).
Proof.
Using the resulting prot and the emission equivalence, we obtain
EC(qEC ; E) = P (qEC)qEC   C(qEC) K(g(qEC)  E)
> P (qEI)qEI   C(qEI) K(g(qEI)  E)
= P (qEI)qEI   C(qEI) K(g(qEI)  qEI) = EI(qEI ; );
where the inequality follows from the fact that argmaxfqg P (q)q C(q) K(g(q)  E) = qEC
and qEI 6= qEC : 
We explain the intuition behind Lemma 1 and Proposition 1. Under emission intensity,
the rm faces a time-inconsistency problem. In the second stage, given , an increase in q
increases the upper limit of emissions. Therefore, the rm has a stronger incentive to increase
its output than under emission cap commitment (Lemma 1). However, this makes it stricter
for the required  in the rst stage to meet the emission target E. This reduces the rm's
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prot. Therefore, the rm's prot is larger under emission cap commitment, which does not
yield such a time-inconsistency problem, than under emission intensity commitment.
We now discuss social welfare. Emission intensity commitment is superior for consumer
welfare than is emission cap commitment (Lemma 2), but is less protable for the rm
(Proposition 1). Thus, it is generally ambiguous which is socially preferable. Let WEI( E)
and WEC( E) be the equilibrium welfare under emission intensity commitment and emission
cap commitment, respectively. We present two cases in which emission intensity commit-
ment yields greater welfare than emission cap commitment (i.e., WEI( E) > WEC( E)).
First, we consider the case with the most stringent target case ( E is close to zero). When
the rm is not allowed to pollute in the process of producing output (i.e., E =  = 0), all
emissions are reduced by the abatement activities and there are no emissions in the indus-
try. Regardless of the output level, the total emissions are zero if and only if emissions per
unit of output are zero. Therefore, when E = 0, emission cap commitment and emission
intensity commitment yield the same outcome. Let qZ and xZ be common q and x under
the zero-emission constraint (i.e., when E = 0).
We now present a result when E is close to zero.
Proposition 2 If E is suciently close to zero, emission intensity commitment yields
greater welfare than does emission cap commitment.
Proof.
For i = EC;EI, we obtain
@W i
@ E

E=0
=
@W
@q
dqi
d E
+
@W i
@x
dxi
d E
+
@W i
@E
= (P (qZ)  C 0(qZ))dq
i
d E
 K 0(xZ)dx
i
d E
  0(0)
= (P (qZ)  C 0(qZ))dq
i
d E
 K 0(xZ)

g0(qZ)
dqi
d E
  1

  0(0)
= (P (qZ)  C 0(qZ) K 0(xZ)g0(qZ))dq
i
d E
+K 0(xZ)  0(0);
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where we use g x = E (and thus, dxi=d E = g0(dqi=d E) 1), and (qEC ; xEC) = (qEI ; xEI) =
(qZ ; xZ) when E = 0. Because qZ < qEC < qEI for all E > 0, we obtain
dqEI
d E

E=0
>
dqEC
d E

E=0
:
From (5), we obtain P  C 0  K 0g0 > P + P 0q  C 0  K 0g0 = 0. Under these conditions, we
obtain
@WEI
@ E

E=0
>
@WEC
@ E

E=0
:
Because WEI = WEC when E = 0, we obtain Proposition 2. 
The intuition behind the result is as follows. As we explained after Proposition 1, given
 > 0, the rm has a stronger incentive to expand its output under emission intensity
commitment than under emission cap commitment, because under emission intensity, the
rm can increase the upper limit of emissions in the second stage (time-inconsistency prob-
lem). However, this problem does not exist when E =  = 0. Therefore, qEC = qEI and
xEC = xEI when E =  = 0.
An increase in  relaxes the restriction on emissions. This leads to an increase in
emissions, resulting in larger disutility from the emissions (emission eect). However, by
the assumption of emission equivalence between two regimes, the emission eect is the same
for two regimes. An increase in E and  aects q and x (allocation eect). As stated above,
emission intensity commitment yields larger q and x than emission cap commitment does.
Given the emission level, under emission cap commitment, the marginal social cost of
the reduction of emissions by reduction of q is P=g0 and that by the increase of x is K 0.
The marginal private cost for meeting the constraint by the reduction of q for the rm is
(P +P 0q)=g0 and that by the increase of x is K 0. Thus, both x and q chosen by the rm are
too small for social welfare. Given the emission level, under emission intensity, the marginal
private cost for meeting the constraint by the reduction of q for the rm is (P+P 0q)=(g0 )
and that by the increase of x is K 0. When  is small, both x and q chosen by the rm are
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still too small for social welfare, but both are larger than under emission cap commitment.
Therefore, emission intensity commitment is better for social welfare than is emission cap
commitment.
We believe that the most stringent case discussed in Proposition 2 is important. Under
the Paris Climate Agreement, many countries, such as the UK, France, Germany, and Japan,
plan to reduce CO2 emissions drastically by 2050 (about 80% reduction at least against a
business-as-usual scenario). To achieve this goal, several industries, such as electric power
and transport, an emission constraint that is close to zero emissions might be imposed.
Thus, the most stringent case discussed in Proposition 2 might be realistic.
Next, we examine the opposite case, the loosest constraint case in which E is close to
EB.
Proposition 3 Suppose that E is suciently close to EB. Emission intensity commitment
yields greater welfare than does emission cap commitment.
Proof.
For i = EC;EI, we obtain
@W i
@ E

E=EB
=
@W
@q
dqi
d E
+
@W i
@x
dxi
d E
+
@W i
@E
= (P (qB)  C 0(qB))dq
i
d E
 K 0(xB)dx
i
d E
  0( E)
= (P (qB)  C 0(qB))dq
i
d E
  0;
where we use qEC = qEI = qB and xEC = xEI = 0 when E = EB and K 0(0) = 0: Because
qEC < qEI < qB for all E < EB, we obtain
dqEI
d E

E=EB
>
dqEC
d E

E=EB
:
From (5), we obtain P   C 0 > 0. Under these conditions,
@WEI
@ E

E=EB
>
@WEC
@ E

E=EB
:
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Because WEI = WEC when E = EB, we obtain Proposition 3. 
We explain the intuition behind Proposition 3. Because of emission equivalence, the
emission eect is the same between two regimes. When E = EB, qEC = qEI = qB and
xEC = xEI = 0. Because K 0(0) = 0, this abatement level is too low for social welfare, and
a marginal reduction of emissions by an increase in x is much more ecient than that by
a reduction in q for social welfare. In other words, given the emission, q is too large and x
is too small for social welfare. A marginal decrease in  increases x and reduces q under
both emission cap commitment and emission intensity commitment, which improves welfare.
The magnitude of this eect is stronger under emission intensity commitment. Note that
qEI > qEC and thus, xEI > xEC for E 2 (0; EB).
In Propositions 2 and 3, we show that when the target level is close to the strictest
and loosest cases, emission intensity commitment is better for social welfare than emission
cap commitment. Emission intensity commitment stimulates production and mitigates the
problem of suboptimal production and abatement investment, which improves welfare under
emission equivalence. Because emission intensity commitment is better for social welfare
in the two polar cases, it might be natural to guess that emission intensity commitment is
better for any E 2 (0; EB). However, this is not true.
Let
 
x( E); q( E)

be the pair of the second{best abatement and output level (social
optimum x and q given E = E). The derivation is as follows. Given E, the social planner's
problem is
max
q;x
W =
Z q
0
P (z)dz   C(q) K(x)  ( E)
s:t: E = g(q)  x:
The second-best output level, q( E), is characterized by the following rst-order condition:
@W
@q
= P   C 0  K 0g0 = 0: (7)
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x( E) is derived from E = g(q)  x:
As discussed above, qEC( E) < q( E) and thus, xEC( E) < x( E). Note that qEC( E) is
derived P + P 0q   C 0   K 0g0 = 0: In the two polar cases (the strictest and loosest cases), 
xEC( E); qEC( E)

=
 
xEI( E); qEI( E)

: Except for the two polar cases,
 
xEC( E); qEC( E)

< 
xEI( E); qEI( E)

holds. As long as
 
xEC( E); qEC( E)

<
 
xEI( E); qEI( E)

<
 
x( E); q( E)

,
the outcome under emission intensity commitment is closer to the second-best outcome than
that under emission cap commitment, and thus, emission intensity commitment naturally
yields greater welfare than emission intensity commitment. However, it is possible that 
xEI( E); qEI( E)

>
 
x( E); q( E)

. Because emission intensity can yield excessive produc-
tion and excessive abatement investment, emission cap commitment might be better than
emission intensity commitment for social welfare.
We present an example showing that emission cap commitment could be better than
emission intensity commitment for welfare. Suppose that the inverse demand is linear
(P = a  bq), the marginal production cost is constant (normalized to zero), emissions are
proportional to output (g = eq), and the abatement cost is quadratic (K = kx2=2). In this
example, EB = ae=2b and  = e when E = EB.
Straightforward calculation yields the resulting welfare for each regime. ComparingWEI
with WEC , we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4 Suppose that P = a  bq, C = 0, g = eq, and K = kx2=2. Then,
WEI > (<)WEC if k < (>)~k;
where
~k :=
b(2e2   3e + 32 +p4e4 + 4e3 + 5e22   18e3 + 94)
2e2(e  ) ;
lim E!0 ~k = lim E!EB ~k =1, ~k is U-shaped with respect to E, and ~k  k := (5b+ b
p
89)=2e2
for any E 2 (0; EB).
Proof See the Appendix.
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Figure 1 shows this result graphically (the case in which a = 5, b = 1, and e = 2).
Emission Cap
Emission Intensity
0 1 2 3 4 EB
E
1
3
k
5
k
Figure 1: Welfare Comparison:
If k is not large, emission intensity commitment yields greater welfare regardless of E.
However, if k is large, emission cap commitment yields greater welfare, because x can be
excessive under emission intensity commitment.
As discussed above, production and abatement can be excessive under emission intensity
commitment, leading to Proposition 4. Figure 2 shows that x can be smaller than xEI ,
although x is larger than xEI regardless of E (the case in which a = 5, b = 1, k = 3, and
e = 2). In other words, the abatement level under emission intensity commitment is too
large (and the output level is also too large) to achieve the target level of emissions.
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Figure 2: Abatement Level Comparison
4 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we compare two self-regulation tools, emission cap commitment and emis-
sion intensity commitment. We nd that prot-maximizing rms always choose emission
cap commitment. However, emission intensity commitment always yields greater consumer
welfare and can yield greater welfare. Moreover, we present two cases in which emission
intensity commitment yields greater welfare than emission cap commitment does: the case
of the strictest target, which is close to a zero-emission target, and the case of the loos-
est target, which is close to business as usual. Our result suggests that the government
should encourage the adoption of emission intensity commitment, especially to achieve a
zero-emission society eciently, because rms prefer emission cap commitment to emission
intensity commitment, even when it is not desirable for welfare.
Our study neglects any uncertainty of demand or cost. If the rms commit to self-
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regulation before knowing the demand parameter, an increase of the degree of demand
uncertainty increases the advantage of emission intensity commitment over emission cap
commitment for both the welfare and prots of the rms. This is because the rms can
expand (shrink) their output more exibly under emission intensity commitment than under
emission cap commitment when demand is high (low). We consider this is the reason that
some companies, such as Japanese electric power companies, choose emission intensity com-
mitments as their favored form of self-regulation. Comparing the two tools after introducing
demand uncertainty is left to future research.
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A Proof of Proposition 4
First, we consider the equilibrium outputs for each regime. From (3) and (5), we obtain
qEI =
a
2b+ k(e  ) ; q
EC =
a+ ke E
2b+ e2k
:
Substituting the equilibrium outputs into total surplus, we obtain
WEI() =
a(a(3b+ k(e  )2)  2(2b+ k(e  )2))
2(2b+ k(e  )2)2 ;
WEC( E) =
(a2 + 2ake E)(3b+ ke2)  E(bk E(4b+ ke2) + 2(2b+ ke2)2)
2(2b+ ke2)2
:
Using EEI() = qEI = E, WEC( E) can be rewritten as a function of . Thus, we obtain
WEI() WEC( E) = a
2k(e  )H
2(2b+ k(e  )2)2(2b+ ke2)2
where H := 4b2  k2e2(e  ) + bk(2e2  3e+32). WEI() WEC( E) is positive if and
only if H > 0 and
H > (<)0 if k < (>)~k =
b(2e2   3e + 32 +p4e4 + 4e3 + 5e22   18e3 + 94)
2e2(e  ) :
Remember that  is determined by EEI() = E, thus, ~k also depends on the emission target
via . It implies that WEI() > (<)WEC( E) if k < (>)~k. Because lim!0 ~k = lim!e ~k =
1, we obtain lim E!0 ~k = lim E!EB ~k =1.
Dierentiating ~k with , we obtain
@~k
@ 
=
b(e  2)(2e2 + e  2 +p4e4 + 4e3 + 5e22   18e3 + 94)
2(e  )2p4e4 + 4e3 + 5e22   18e3 + 94 :
Because @~k=@  is negative (positive) when  < (>) e=2, ~k( E) is U-shaped and is minimized
at  = e=2. Because ~k is minimized when  = e=2, we obtain k = (5b + b
p
89)=2e2. Note
that ( E) is increasing, (0) = 0; and (EB) = e. 
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